Cloudlet deployment and resource allocation for mobile users (MUs) have been extensively studied in existing works for computation resource scarcity. However, most of them failed to jointly consider the two techniques together, and the selfishness of cloudlet and access point (AP) are ignored. Inspired by the group-buying mechanism, this paper proposes three-stage auction schemes by combining cloudlet placement and resource assignment, to improve the social welfare subject to the economic properties. We first divide all MUs into some small groups according to the associated APs. Then the MUs in same group can trade with cloudlets in a group-buying way through the APs. Finally, the MUs pay for the cloudlets if they are the winners in the auction scheme. We prove that our auction schemes can work in polynomial time.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, portable devices such as smartphones and tablet PCs have evolved to reach a significant performance enhancement. However, applications running on those mobile devices also consume many
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resources, e.g. computing, storage, et al. Particularly, multiple applications are often run on the same devices of mobile users (MUs).
Therefore, the resource-limited mobile devices still require a lot more resources for better performance, to tackle real-time and delay-sensitive tasks, such as Virtual Reality games and Automatic driving.
A cloudlet is formed by a group of internet-well-connected, resource-rich, and trusted computers When the centralized cloud is too far away from MUs. Cloudlet can be utilized by neighboring MUs [1] , and it also can bring us a good solution for the resource requirement problem as described above. MUs can achieve much better performance by offloading their delay-sensitive or computation-intensive tasks to the cloudlet nearby [2] , because the cloudlets can provide them with low-latency and rich computing resource access [3] .
The resource allocation has been investigated in the work [4] , and the cloudlet deployment for task offloading has been discussed in [5] , [6] . Many efficient algorithms have been proposed in [7] , [8] , to balance the workload among the cloudlets for reducing the MUs' delay. But access points (APs) and cloudlets may be reluctant to provide those services without any rewards, due to selfishness. To inspire cloudlets sharing their resources with MUs, incentive mechanisms have been introduced [9] , [10] . However, one cloudlet only serve one MU in those works. Moreover, the resource in a cloudlet is always too expensive to be employed by a single MU.
To solve the above problems, there are several challenges: 1) How to place the cloudlets at APs efficiently.
2) How to assign cloudlet resources to the MUs when each MU has limited budget. 3) How to provide incentive for the three kinds entities (MUs, APs, Cloudlets).
Therefore, motivated by the group-buying scheme for spectrum allocation [11] , we propose three efficient auction schemes to solve the problems of cloudlet placement and resource assignment jointly, which consists of three stages in each scheme. In the first stage, we divide all MUs into several small groups of MUs according to the AP they connected to, and then we figure out the total budget for each group of MUs. In the second stage, we assign cloudlets to APs. Finally, we charge MUs in the third stage according to the matching results.
The main contributions of this work can be summarized as follows. 1) We propose three auction schemes for joint cloudlet placement and resource assignment. The first scheme randomly generates a number m according to the capacity of each given cloudlet, followed by selecting the first m MUs according to the performance price ratio, calculating the budget for the given cloudlet.
2) Based on the first scheme, the second scheme calculates several profitable cases and then randomly selects one from them. It can improve the revenue of the small MU groups significantly. In the third scheme, we match cloudlets with APs in a global way based on the second scheme.
3) We prove that all three schemes can work in polynomial time. We also provide proofs for individual rationality, budget balance and truthfulness. Both theoretical analysis and simulation results show that the proposed schemes outperform the existing work in this paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes related works about incentive mechanisms for resource allocation in mobile cloud computing. Section 3 formulates the resource allocation problem and describe the three-stage auction model. Section 4 introduces our algorithms in the auction model, together with some examples. In section 5, we prove the economic properties for the proposed auction model. Simulation results are given in section 6. Finally, section 7 concludes this paper.
RELATED WORK
Resource allocation in mobile cloud computing is one of the fresh and meaningful topics in recent years [12] , [13] . Mobile users offload their heavy tasks to the neighboring cloudlet, this has been an appealing way to relieve their demand for resources [14] , [15] . For cloudlet deployment, many existing works such as [3] , [7] , [8] care about the cloudlet placement in a given network, and most of them focus on allocation cloudlet resource in a centralized manner. Mike and his partners [3] [7] discuss the challenge of cloudlet load balancing, and they proposed a useful algorithm which is fast and scalable to balance the workload for each cloudlet in the wireless metropolitan area networks. In [8] , how to place cloudlets is first considered to reduce the processing delay for tasks while the resource of the cloudlet is limited. Authors propose a heuristic algorithm and an approximation algorithm to place cloudlets. However, those works [3] [7] [8] do not take the cost of cloudlets and APs into consideration. Cloudlets and APs in this system may feel reluctant to share their resource to the mobile users without any reward.
Incentive mechanisms which take those costs into consideration have been discussed in [16] . Resource allocation schemes in those works are more flexible and intelligent. Also, the resource holder and relay nodes are willing to serve users. The auction schemes are wildly used in the study of computer science, the details can be seen in [17] , [18] . In [16] , a cooperative bargaining game-theoretic algorithm is addressed for resource allocation in cognitive small cell networks. However, one cloudlet can only serve one MU in those works. The group-buying idea is introduced in [11] and [19] . In [11] , a group-buying auction model is proposed to manage the spectrum redistribution, and the problem of that a single buyer cannot afford the whole spectrum is fixed.
In this paper, we introduce group-buying model into cloudlet deployment, to divide independent MUs into small groups based on the associated APs. Therefore, MUs of each group can afford those expensive cloudlets, and the cloudlet may share its resources with MUs in a flexible and efficient way. Different from our conference version [20] , we have added one more auction scheme in this work and we have extended the conference work to better present the main idea of the three stage auction scheme.
SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION

Problem Formulation
The MU can be regarded as the buyer in our auction schemes. The cloudlet is constituted by resourceabundant devices, it is also the seller in our auction schemes. The AP is the access point of the wireless network for MUs, and it also can be placed with a cloudlet to improve mobile devices' performance, so it is the auctioneer between MUs and cloudlets.
Assume that the number of cloudlets is K. C k indicates the kth cloudlet. Cap k indicates the resource capacity of C k . As defined as in [21] , the cost function of cloudlet is
where c(k) is the cost factor of C k , and w(k) is the workload brought by MUs' offloaded tasks. In this paper, we try to make the cloudlet share its resources to a suitable small group of MUs rather than just one MU. To inspire cloudlets sharing their resources, we define the reserve price of C k , denoted as r k ,
Where C k must be paid at least r k , no matter which group of MUs finally wins C k . Cloudlets in this paper may be heterogeneous, we assume that their capacity and cost factor may be different with each other, so their reserve price will also be different. While cloudlet C k joins in the auction scheme, its total resource capacity Cap k and cost factor c(k) are fixed. C k cannot change them during the whole auction. Then, r k is also fixed. By the way, C k can adjust its reserve price r k by changing its parameter δ after a whole auction, such as increasing the value of δ if its resource is over competitive in the market, and decreasing the value of δ while the resource is oversupplied, which will make C k benefit more from the auction, but this feedback mechanism is out of the scope this paper. Therefore, we assume δ = 0 in this paper.
Assume that the number of AP is n in the given network. a i indicates the ith AP, and it is connected with n i MUs. In this paper, MUs connect to the wireless network through AP. Therefore, we can easily divide MUs into some groups base on the connected AP by the MUs. Each group of MUs can be assigned at most one cloudlet, and if the group of MUs which connects with a i is assigned with cloudlet C k , the MUs in the group cannot request other cloudlet resource, and the cloudlet C k can only serve for the MUs in the group of a i . It is noteworthy that this is different with [7] , where MU can request service from other cloudlets if it's local AP do not have cloudlet or the assigned cloudlet is out of service. In our auction schemes, APs are the auctioneer who deals with the transaction between MUs and cloudlets. 
But MUs' valuation for each cloudlet is unknown to others, so the auction scheme must be truthful enough to prevent MU benefit more by bidding untruthfully, or the auction will bankrupt soon.
When the transactions are done after our three-stage auctions, the winner MUs will pay for the winner cloudlets and the connected APs, the winner cloudlets will be placed on its matching AP and serve for the small group of MUs connected by this AP. For instance, if MUs in a i wins C k , C k will be placed on a i , and then C k provides services to MUs in a i . Let w i be the winner set, which consists of the winner MUs in the group of MUs in a i . Let p 
where v j i (k) is the valuation of m j i on the cloudlet C k it wins. This equation implies the m j i obtains the benefit from the auction. Similarly, the winner set W contains the winner APs. If a i is a winner AP, its clearing price is P i . When a i bid truthfully, its utility u i is defined as
where R k i is the actual revenue that a i calculates for its winner cloudlet C k . Let W ′ be the set of winner cloudlets, and P k be the clearing price of C k . Its utility u k is defined as
The social welfare can quantify the efficiency of our auction schemes. Let SW be the social welfare, 6 which means the total utility of all participants in the auction. It is defined as 
System Model
The Fig. 1 shows the model of our three-stage auction schemes. In the first stage, we divide MUs into n small groups according to the APs that connect the MUs and cloudlets. Then, in each group the AP calculates its total revenue for each cloudlet, e.g. the AP a i calculates the revenue R
is calculated according to the budget of the MU group in a i , and these budgets are their bids for C k , i.e.,
The total revenue quantify the preference of the MU group on each cloudlet. In the AP a i , the MU m j i which has been utilized in calculating R k i will be regarded as a potential winner for cloudlet C k , and its potential price is p On the other hand, C k will only share its resources with the MU who paid for it. We cannot ensure that all MUs in a i can be served by C k , due to the constraints of economic properties. The rest of MUs will be left to the next round of the auction, which is not within the scope of this paper.
In the second stage, APs submit their budget to each cloudlet. This budget is the total budget of the MU group in the corresponding AP, which is generated base on the revenue for each cloudlet. For instance, the budget of a i for C k is B k i which is the price that a i bid for C k . For each AP, its revenue R k i is provided by its MU group. It is a real value, and the budget B k i is generated by itself, we can easily find that both R k i and B k i are public information. Therefore, we can easily verify that whether a i bid truthfully or not. After that, we try to match cloudlets with APs while subjecting to our desired properties. As a result, for the winner set of cloudlets W ′ and the winner set of APs W , the matching result between W ′ and W can be defined by the mapping function σ(). For example, σ(i) = k means cloudlet C k is assigned to AP a i , and their clearing prices P i and P k are same.
Then, in the third stage, the winner MUs set in a i is w i , winning APs will charge them according to their potential winner price generated in the first stage. 
Desirable Properties
Truthfulness
Let θ be a positive number. The participants may pay an extra cost θ to figure out how to bid in the auction scheme that makes them benefit more. When MU m j i bid untruthfully, we define the utility u j i as follows.
Similarly, we now define the utility u i for the case of that AP a i bid untruthfully.
The extra cost θ varies for different MUs and different APs. The different market situation also causes different extra cost even for the same MU (or the same AP). In this paper, we define truthfulness as a weakly dominate strategy as mentioned in [9] , where the player cannot improve its utility by bidding an untruthful bid in truthful auction scheme. Truthfulness is significant for an auction, we must ensure
and u i ≥ u i for each MUs and APs to keep our auction truthful. In our auction scheme, we discuss the truthfulness in which only one player can change its bid or strategy, and the others cannot.
Budget balance
The total price charging for buyers is not less than the total price paid for sellers. If
Individual rationality
For sellers, they cannot benefit at a price smaller than it's asked, i.e., P k ≥ r k . For buyers, they cannot be charged at a price bigger than it's bid, i.e., b
Computation efficiency
We will prove that the schemes can be performed in polynomial time.
AUCTION SCHEMES
In this section, we describe the proposed three auction schemes. The first is for Three-stage Auction scheme for Cloudlet Deployment, named TACD. The second, named TACDp, is an improved version of TACD by refining the first stage of the auction scheme. The third is called TACDpp, that is derived from TACDp by improving the mapping approach in its second stage.
Framework of the Schemes
All these three schemes are inspired by the idea of "group-buying". Each scheme consists of three stages.
In stage I, APs calculate the revenue from their small group of MUs, and figure out the potential winner MUs for each cloudlet, the algorithm used in this stage is named ACRC. The revenue matrix is indicated as
, which is formed by the revenues of the APs for each cloudlet. APs can bid for cloudlets according to {R k i }, and these bids form the budget matrix {B
In stage II, we match APs with cloudlets according to the budget matrix {B k i } and the reserve price vector
, where the vector is formed by the reserve price of cloudlets, and the algorithm in this stage named ASC. In stage III, the winner APs, which are placed with cloudlets, allocate resources to their winner MUs and charge these MUs.
Scheme 1: TACD
Stage I: Calculating Revenue
The algorithm used in the first stage of TACD is named ACRC. For more details, see Algorithm 1. At first, for each AP such as a i , we calculate its revenue R k i for all cloudlets. Obviously, the revenue R 
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Maximizing the number s subject to
The revenue set {S x } = GT R(A, s), and the revenue of the first s − 1 cases is S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S s−1 .
5:
The integer m is randomly generated in [(s + 1)/2, s − 1].
6:
Then the revenue
7:
Then the unit price p equals to the (m + 1)th MU's performance price ratio in A. 
where l The set A consists of the MUs in a i , where the MUs are sorted in descending order in terms of their performance price ratio t j i (k). Let A x be the set of MUs which are the first x (x ≤ n i ) members of A. Let l x be the workload of the xth MU in A, i.e., l 1 is the workload of the first MU in A. Let L x be the total workload of A x , i.e., L x = l 1 + l 2 + l 3 + ... + l x . We try to find the index s in A to maximize L s , in which
If the total workload of the MUs in a i is less than or equal to Cap k , i.e.,
Let S x be the revenue which is generated by the first x MUs of A. The unit price p is equal to the (x + 1)-th MU's performance price ratio in A.
4:
L x is total workload of the first x MUs in A.
5:
Then S x = p · L x . 6: end for 7: return {S x } price which equals to the performance price ratio of the (x + 1)th member in A. The Algorithm 2 which named GTR is to get the revenue set {S x }, where
It means if a i is allocated with C k after the whole auction scheme, then the MUs which m j i ∈ w k i are winners, and they will be charged at p
, that is the preference of the MUs in a i for the cloudlet C k .
In TACD, we choose the random number m in [s + 1)/2, s − 1] based on the following reasons. First, the number m must be a random number to keep our auction truthful, and we will discuss it later. Second, if the random number m is close to 1, the unit price p will be increased but the number of winner MUs will be reduced, and it will go opposite side if m close to s. The performance comparisons for different m values are mentioned in [11] , the authors addressed that the APs will get more budget while the number of MUs fall in [30%, 70%]. Similarly, in this paper the APs will get more budget when the number m is randomly generated in [s + 1)/2, s − 1]. Third, for each AP, the more budget it calculates the easier it wins a more profitable cloudlet in the second stage. Finally, if AP gets the same revenue at m 1 = 0.3s and m 2 = 0.7s, it will win the next stage at the same probability, but there is a big difference between the social welfare derived from the two settings of m. It is clear that m = 0.7s is better. In summary, we generate the random number in [s + 1)/2, s − 1], so that AP can calculate a higher budget and get more profits.
To illustrate the detail of ACRC in TACD, we provide an simple example to demonstrate how this algorithm works for AP a i . In this example, the performance price ratios of the MUs on C 1 and C 2 are shown in Table 3 (a). Their workload vector is shown in Table 3 (b), and the capacity vector of cloudlet is shown in Table 3 (c). For cloudlet C 1 , we sort MUs in terms of their performance price ratio t 
Stage II: Matching Cloudlet for AP
The algorithm used in this stage is named ASC, more details are shown in Algorithm 3. In this stage, APs deal with cloudlets according to the budget of APs and the reserve price of cloudlets. In TACD, we assign cloudlet to AP in a greedy manner, as mentioned in the existing work [22] . In ASC, we generate the profit Algorithm ASC can ensure the utility of both APs and cloudlets if they are winners in the auction. For each winner AP-cloudlet matching, their clearing price P i , P k are independent with B k i and r k , both a i and C k cannot modify the clearing price by themselves. This is helpful to keep the auction truthful.
Stage III: Charging for winner
In this stage, the winner APs choose the winner MUs according to their potential winner set, and then charge them at their potential winner price p 
Scheme 2: TACDp
In this subsection, we propose a more efficient scheme named TACD plus (TACDp). The TACDp improves the first stage of TACD by changing the generation method of m in ACRC, so that the APs in TACDp can get more revenue. In TACD, m is randomly generated in [(s + 1)/2, s − 1], it may sacrifice many MUs, resulting Getting AP a i and its matching cloudlet C k by algorithm FRM(D, A ′ , x).
σ(i) = k 7:
Setting the values of elements in ith row of D to 0
11:
Setting the values of elements in kth column of D to 0 4 : return a i , C k in the performance decrease of TACD, although it can keep the auction scheme truthful. In TACDp, we calculate several profitable revenues and then randomly select one from them as the revenue of the target AP. In this section, we assume that the default value of top 1 is 3. Then, we select the top 3 profitable revenues S x 1 , S x 2 , S x 3 from S, and m is randomly selected from {x 1 , x 2 , x 3 }, denoted as m = random{x 1 , x 2 , x 3 }. We can also change the value of top 1 to get a better result, e.g., top 1 = 2, then we select the top 2 profitable revenues S x 1 , S x 2 from S, and m = random{x 1 , x 2 }. The different value of top 1 will lead to different average revenue and different degree of truthfulness. The effect of top 1 will be discussed in the next section.
To illustrate the first stage of TACDp, we calculate the revenue of a i on C 2 , which is shown in Table   3 . The ACRC in TACDp is shown in Fig. 3 . In this example, top 1 = 3. Following TACD, we generate the number s and the revenue set S, resulting in s = 10 and S = {8.5, 13.0, 21.9, 27.3, 31.3, 38.1, 40.3, 40.2, 33.8}.
The top 3 cases in S is S 7 , S 8 , S 6 , then m = random {6, 7, 8}, the average revenue is 39.5. It is worthwhile to point out that, the average revenue in TACD is 36.7. Thus, the revenue of the APs in TACDp is improved.
The rest steps of TACDp are the same with TACD. Note that, the value of top 1 must be larger than 1. In this case, let S max be the most profitable revenue of S, we cannot fix the revenue of AP at S max . This is because, we cannot keep ACRC truthful if we always choose R k i = S max . For instance, S max = S 7 , i.e.,40.3 in Fig 3 and 
Scheme 3: TACDpp
We introduce another efficient algorithm named TACDpp in this subsection. The TACDpp is the improved version of TACDp, which refines the second stage of TACDp. The difference between TACDp and TACDpp is that, TACDpp replaces algorithm FRM with algorithm FRMG in ASC. The first stage of TACDpp is the same as that of TACDp. In the second stage, TACDpp matches cloudlets for APs in a global way, which is different with TACDp. In TACDpp, we match cloudlets with APs by algorithm FRMG, which is shown in Algorithm 5. Let top 2 be a small number, it is the top factor in FRMG, its default value is 2. For each round, FRMG gets a random integer rnd in [1, top 2 ], then selects the rndth profitable value d k i from the profit matrix D, and it returns {a i , C k } to ASC for further judgement. When the network is unbalanced between supply and demand, i.e., K = n, TACDpp can perform better due to the global idea. It is also worth to mention that we must ensure top 2 > 1 which is similar with top 1 . It will be discussed later.
The performance comparison of the proposed schemes is shown in Table 4 . This table lists the algorithms employed in each stage and the generation approach of the number m.
DESIRED PROPERTIES
Truthfulness
Theorem 1: The schemes TACD, TACDp and TACDpp are truthful in ACRC. 
Proof:
To verify the truthfulness of ACRC, we only need to prove that MUs are truthful in our auction.
In TACD, for the MU m 
We have now discussed the truthfulness of MUs in TACD, while MU m j i bid for the kth cloudlet. And the other cloudlets do not need care about whether m j i cheat or not, if the kth cloudlet C k is assigned to the AP a i finally.
Similarly, MUs in TACDp and TACDpp are also truthful in ACRC, because these two schemes only change the way we get the random integer m.
Theorem 2:
The schemes TACD, TACDp and TACDpp are truthful in ASC.
Proof:
For TACD and TACDp, their algorithms in the second stage are similar to the algorithm fixed price auction as mentioned in [22] . This auction scheme has been proved to be truthful, we only change the generation manner of clearing price in TACD and TACDp while the transactions is done. Furthermore, the clearing price is independent to AP and cloudlet in the second stage of TACD and TACDp. Therefore, TACD and TACDp are also truthful for ASC.
For TACDpp in ASC, we ensure its truthfulness by the top factor top 2 , which is discussed in the simulation section.
Budget Balanced
Theorem 3: The schemes TACD, TACDp and TACDpp are budget balanced.
Proof:
In this paper, we only prove that TACD is budget balanced. The proof of TACDp and TACDpp are identical to that of TACD.
In TACD, if σ(i) = k, a i ∈ W and C k ∈ W ′ , then the total clearing price charge for the MUs is val 1
where
Similarly, the total clearing price for cloudlets is val 2 where val 2 = K k=1 P k , the total clearing price for APs is val 3 where 
Individual Rationality
Theorem 4: The schemes TACD, TACDp and TACDpp are subject to the individual rationality.
Proof:
The individual rationality for TACD can be proved as follows. For sellers, according to the judgement in ASC, the clearing price for cloudlets cannot smaller than they asked, i.e., P k is always bigger than r k .
For buyers, if MU m j i wins the cloudlet C k , the MU will be charged at p j i where p
. p is the performance price ratio of the mth MU in A, and p ≤ t
For APs, we obtain B k i = R k i according to the ACRC. Also, the adjustment factor f is in the scope of (0, 1) in ASC, thus, the clearing price of AP
The proof of individual rationality for TACDp and TACDpp iss the same as that of TACD.
Computational Efficiency
Theorem 5: The time complexity of TACD as well as TACDp is O(K · n log n).
Proof:
For ACRC, the sorting needs O(n log n) time, finding the number s takes O(n) time, and the algorithm GTR also takes O(n) time. The time complexity of ACRC in TACD and TACDp is O(K · n log n). For ASC, distributing APs randomly takes O(n log n) time, the algorithm FRM takes O(K) time. So, the time complexity of ASC in TACD and TACDp is O(n · K). Therefore the total time complexity of TACD and TACDp are O(K · n log n).
Theorem 6:
The time complexity of TACDpp is O(K · n 2 ).
Proof:
The time complexity of ACRC in TACDpp is the same as that of TACDp, which is O(K · n log n). For ASC, the algorithm FRMG takes O(n · K) time, which is different from the algorithm FRM. Thus, the time complexity of ASC in TACDpp is O(K · n 2 ). Therefore the total time complexity of TACDpp is O(K · n 2 ).
NUMERICAL RESULTS
Simulation Setup
In this paper, we simulate our works on MATLAB R2014a. In the simulation, the capacities of all the U (1, 15) . We compare our auction schemes with the strategy Heaviest Access Point First (HAF) [7] . HAF is an efficient scheme for cloudlet placement and resource allocation without auction. In this paper, the strategy HAF is working in the following way, at first, HAF sorts APs in terms of the total workload of MUs in descending order. Then, HAF sorts cloudlets in terms of their capacity in descending order. At last, HAF matches cloudlets for APs by turns. For instance, HAF assigns the first cloudlet whose capacity is the biggest to the first AP whose total workload of MUs is the heaviest, then HAF assigns the second cloudlet to the second AP and so on. If C k is assigned to a i , the budget that a i bid for C k is B k i . It is calculated using the method as in ACRC, but the number m is a fixed integer where m = s, and the potential winner MUs is the first m MUs in A, i.e., A m . The unit price p charged by AP is the performance price ratio of the mth MU in A. In HAF, a i only needs to calculate the budget on C k . The transaction between a i and C k will be done if B k i ≥ r k , which is different from the algorithm ASC. It is obvious that, if HAF is an incentive mechanism, then it is untruthful. Moreover, the time complexity of HAF is O(n log n) + O(K log K). In the first stage of HAF, the sorting of APs and cloudlets takes O(n log n) and O(K log K) time, respectively. In the second stage of HAF, the matching algorithm takes O(n) + O(K) time. In the first part of our simulation, the top factors top 1 and top 2 are set to 2, and the market is balanced, i.e., K = n. The utility of cloudlets, APs and MUs are shown in Fig. 4, Fig. 5, and Fig. 6 , respectively.
Simulation Results
The social welfare of auction schemes are shown in Fig. 7 . There are big differences between our schemes and the HAF in the first three figures. Fig. 4 shows that our schemes are good for cloudlets, while Fig. 5 show that our schemes are weak for APs. The differences are caused due to the following reasons. In our schemes, we select a bid B j which is bigger than r k . However, if C k is assigned for a i , HAF does not care about the truthfulness, the transaction is done while B k i ≥ r k , and the clearing price is equal to r k . As a result, the utility of cloudlets is close to 0 in HAF as shown in Fig. 4 . Moreover, the APs in HAF may catch many profits during the transaction as shown in Fig. 5 . For the Fig. 6 , it shows that HAF is more profitable for MU than our algorithms. It is because that the winner cloudlet in HAF serve for more MUs by a greedy manner and these MUs are charged with a lower unit price by AP than our schemes.
In our schemes, the number of winner MUs is m − 1 where m ≤ s, the unit price of these MUs is the performance price ratio of the mth MU in A. However, the number of winner MUs in HAF is m where m = s, and the unit price of these MUs are the performance price ratio of the sth MU in A. Then, the number of winner MUs in HAF is more than our schemes, and these winner MUs are charged by a lower price than us. Therefore, it is more profitable for MUs as show in Fig. 5 . The social welfare demonstrates that, while the number of MUs is 1000, the social welfare in TACD is 5% less than HAF, TACDp is 4.5% higher than HAF, and TACDpp is 5.6% higher than HAF. Moreover, our schemes perform better if there are more MUs in the wireless access network. For example, when the number of MUs is 1400, TACD is 1.7% less than HAF, TACDp and TACDpp are 7.6% and 7.9% higher than HAF respectively.
If the number of APs is bigger than the number of cloudlets, i.e., n > K, the performance of our auction schemes in "unbalanced market" is shown in Fig. 8 . In this situation, the TACDpp performs better than that in the balanced market, because the global matching algorithm FRMG works better. The result is the averaged over 100 random instances. Fig. 9 is the utility of AP for the case of top 2 = 1. In this case, TACDpp matches cloudlet C k for AP a i , while the profit of this matching is the most profitable one in the rest of cloudlets and APs. The utility of a 1 is U 1 and it is 18.7. It is stable and profitable, because TACDpp always makes the same strategy to match cloudlets with APs. In such a fixed strategy, a 1 will get the same profit if it bids truthfully, so the solid line is straight in Fig. 9 . However, it is hard to check whether TACDpp is truthful in ASC while top 2 = 1. Because it may has some "bugs", in which APs can benefit more from their preferred cloudlet, by biding budgets that lower than their revenues. For instance, as we can see in Fig. 9 , the utility of a 1 is U 1 where U 1 = 22.7 − θ, while a 1 bid untruthfully among {64.5, 65.5, 66.5}. U 1 is larger than U 1 , if θ < 4. It is because that, when B , j ∈ [1, n] and j = 1. Then, the clearing price will be much lower than that when it bids truthfully. Therefore, if AP a 1 pays some extra price θ to figure out these more profitable cases, it will get more profits firmly by bidding untruthfully.
Simulation results of TACDpp are shown in Fig. 10 where top 2 = 2. The solid line shows the utility of a 1 while it bids truthfully. This line is not a straight line as shown in Fig. 9 , as the matching strategy is not a fixed pure strategy anymore.
When top 2 = 2, the matching strategy turns to a mixed strategy, we combine the following two strategies with equal probability, i.e. 1/2, 1) Matching cloudlet C k with AP a i whose profit B k i − r k is the most profitable one. 2) Matching cloudlet C k with AP a i whose profit B k i − r k is the second profitable one. So the utility of a 1 is not a stable value, even a 1 always bid truthfully. The utility varies within an interval near 18, which is shown in green solid line. In contrast, the green dotted line shows the utility of a 1 while it bids untruthfully. There are also some more profitable cases while a 1 bids untruthfully, such as {64.5, 65.5, 66.5} as occour ed as in the case of top 2 = 1. But the difference is that, if top 2 = 2, a 1 can also benefit more in those cases with the probability of 50%. Otherwise, a 1 will be matched with other less profitable cloudlets, and it also must pay an extra cost θ to find those cases. Therefore, there is not any evident case in which a 1 can get more utility than the truthful case. It is worthless for a 1 to pay an extra cost θ to determine how to bid untruthfully. Therefore, TACDpp is truthful while top 2 = 2. Similarly, Fig. 11 shows the utility of a 1 while top 2 = 5. It is also a mixed strategy by 5 pure strategies, with the probability of 1/5 for each strategy. These 5 pure strategies are used to match cloudlets to APs.
The jth pure strategy is corresponding to the jth profitable value of B k i −r k for j = 1, 2, · · · , 5. In the mixed strategy, the utility of a 1 varies with a larger range than that in Fig. 10 while a 1 bid truthfully. The value of its utility fall in [12, 14.5] , and it is less than that in Fig. 10 . In other words, the strategy for top 2 = 5 is less profitable and less stable than the strategy for top 2 = 2, while APs bid truthfully. This is because the stronger randomness brings APs many solutions which are not profitable. For truthfulness, there is no evidence that a 1 can get more utility than the truthful one.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed efficient auction schemes for cloudlets placement and resource allocation in wireless networks to improve the social welfare subject to economic properties. We have introduced the group-buying model to inspire cloudlets to serve the MUs. In our auction schemes, MUs can get access to cloudlets through APs, according to their preference and resource demands for cloudlets. The whole three entities MUs, APs, and cloudlets are motivated to participate in resource sharing. We have verified that our schemes are truthful, individual rational, budget balanced and computational efficient. Through simulations, we have shown that our schemes TACDp and TACDpp outperform HAF by about 4.5% and 5.6% respectively, in terms of social welfare, for the case that the number of MUs is 1000.
